PROMISES TO MARRY MADE WITHIN A PROSCRIBED
PERIOD (BUT NOT TO BE CONSUMMATED UNTIL
THE END OF THAT PERIOD)

By NIcK

GALiWIANAKIS*

Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes imposing restrictions
on the right to marry after divorce.' These restrictions, it appears,
have been designed to punish the guilty party or to provide a cooling period for possible reconciliation between parties, and also to
maintain public morality by requiring a certain period to elapse
before either party can remarry. Some of the statutes have been
interpreted to mean that marriages within the prohibited period
are voidable only and not void, but the majority rule is that marriages violating the provisions of the statute are absolutely void. 2
This being the view of marriages entered into in violation of a
state statute, the question arises: How should the courts treat a
promise to marry entered into within the proscribed period, when
the marriage itself is not to be consummated until after the restricted period has terminated? Should the courts, favoring the
equities of the plaintiff, enforce such a promise and thereby permit recovery for breach of the marriage contract; or should the
courts, favoring the initial marriage, hold such a promise unenforceable on the grounds that the same policy which declares a marriage
within the prescribed period void applies with equal force to a
contract to marry notwithstanding the fact that the second marriage is to be performed after the statutory period o.f prohibition?
One solution to the problem is manifested in the recent Texas
decision of Nicholas v. Holder,3 involving an action for breach of
promise to marry. The court held that since the alleged marriage
promise had been made within one year of the promisor's divorce
on the grounds of cruel treatment, it was against public policy irrespective of the date set for the proposed marriage and therefore
unenforceable. The statute involved in the case provided:
"Neither party to a divorce suit, where a divorce is granted
upon the ground of cruel treatment, shall marry any other
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person for a period of twelve months next after such divorce is granted, but the parties so divorced may marry
each other at any time. "4
The court explained that when the divorce was granted on grounds
other than cruelty, the statute did not apply. The court found that
the purpose of the statute was to encourage the remarriage of
persons who had been divorced on the grounds of cruelty, rather
than to punish the parties involved. It was held that an agreement
to marry militated against the public policy of the statute, notwithstanding the fact that the statute did not expressly mention contracts to marry. This conclusion was reached by the court's elasticizing the words of the statute, to wit, "neither party shall marry,"
to include that neither party shall be capable of contracting to
marry. In reaching this conclusion the court cited a leading
Oregon case involving a statute which expressly prohibited a contract to re-marry within the period of prohibition. 5
The decision in the Holder case seems to be fair under the
facts there presented, but the court's analysis of the problem is
not very realistic. The court maintains that such an agreement,
even though not to be consummated until the end of the prohibited
period, is unenforceable, stating in general terms that it is against
public policy. A more cogent reason for the court's decision was
the fact that the plaintiff in the Holder case not only had been
married four times, but had associated with the defendant when
she knew that he was still married and was herself divorced after
she had met the defendant. These facts were undoubtedly persuasive in the court's final decision, but the court does not consider
the plaintiff's knowledge as a factor in the case. Suppose that the
plaintiff did not know that the defendant was incompetent to
marry due to the statutory bar, or that defendant concealed the
fact and promised to marry the plaintiff at a time when the prohibition had expired. Would the statute under these circumstances
be construed to mean that neither party shall be capable of entering
into a contract? Or is this a situation where a suit for breach of
promise should lie?
Another recent Texas case6 dealing with the same statute7
should be contrasted with the Holder case. The court in holding
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a marriage consummated in violation of the statute to be valid cited
28 Tex. Jur. 731 as follows:
"Even though the divorce statute declares that neither
party to a decree granted upon the grounds of cruel treatment shall marry any other person for a period of twelve
months next after the divorce is granted, a marriage contracted within such period is not void. The decree is final
and not interlocutory."
The court held that the appellant was estopped to have the voidable
contract, which he entered into with the knowledge that it was in
violation of the statute, rescinded, and decided that the lower court
did not err in refusing to annul the marriage. The court added
that appellee's inability to marry would not render the marriage
a nullity, since the legislature had not seen fit to make marriages
in violation of the statute void. In the light of the two decisions,
the present status of the statute seems confusing: A marriage consummated within the statutory period is permissible even though
prohibited, but a promise to marry after the proscribed period is
not enforceable. Admittedly, a situation where the marriage has
been consummated can easily be distinguished from the case where
there is only a contract to marry. In the former situation public
policy favors the continued existence of marriage, even though
the marriage was consummated during the statutory period of prohibition. Similarly, in the latter situation, it would seem that
policy should favor the enforcement of a contract to marry in
certain circumstances. 8 At least it is suggested that the court
should have discretion to determine whether such marriage contracts are void or voidable.
Another case to be contrasted with the Holder case is Kungling
v. Williamson,9 which involved an action for breach of promise to
marry. The defendant had made a promise to marry two days before the expiration of the six-month proscribed period following her
divorce, but the marriage was not to be consummated until after the
expiration of the period. The statute in this case provided: "No
marriage shall be contracted . . .within six months after either
[party] has been divorced from a former spouse. " 10 Notice should
be given to the fact that here the statute employed the word "contracted," whereas in the Holder case the court extended the pur8VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, Vol. 1, §6.
9 231 Minn. 135, 42 N.W.2d 534 (1950).
10 MrNxN. STAT. ANx. (1945), § 517.03.
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view of the Texas statute to include a promise to marry. In the
Kungling case the court construed the statute to prohibit the consummation of marriage only, leaving a promise to marry valid even
though it was made within the proscribed period. In the words of
the opinion:
"What is prohibited by the above statute?" Does it prohibit a promise of marriage within the six month period or
only the act of marriage itself? It is elementary that
statutory words and phrases are to be construed according
to the rules of grammar and according to their common
and approved usage unless to do so would be inconsistent
with the intent of the legislature. 'Contracted' as used in
the statute is a transitive verb. Wlebster's International
Dictionary2 points out that to contract marriage or matrimony is to enter into marriage."
The court's then stated that the statute did not prohibit a contract
for marriage and allowed the plaintiff to recover.
From the cases it can readily be seen that there is a difference of
opinion as to the proper rule to be applied to a marriage promise
made by a divorced person during the statutory period of prohibition. One line of authority maintains that such a promise is
valid if the marriage is not to take place until the termination of
the period.' 4 Another view holds that such a promise is invalid
even though the marriage itself is not to be consummated until
after the proscribed period has elapsed.' 5
What are the circumstances which warrant enforceability of a
promise to marry made during the prohibition period? Knowledge
on the part of the promisee of the promisor's competency has played
an important role in the decision of some of the cases ;16 for example,
where the promisee is ignorant of the promisor's incompetency to
marry due to statutory prohibition or divorce decree. In spite of
the public policy to hold promises by married persons unenforce21 JPij.
22 2d Ed., 1947, p. 578.
21 Kungling v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 42 N.W.2& 534 (1950).
2 Ibid. See also, Gress v. Gress, =pra note 6; Leininger Lumber Co. v.
Dewey, 86 Neb. 659, 126 N.W. 87 (1910).
15 Nicholas v. Holder, 244 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; 3ohnson v. Iss,
114 Tenn. 114, 85 S.W. 79 (1905).
16
Davis v. Pryor, 112 Fed. 274 (8th Cir. 1901); Carter v. Rinker, 174 Fed.
882 (C. C. Kan. 1909); Robinson v. Shockley, 266 S.W. 420 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924); Noice v. Brown, 38 N.J.L. 228 (1876); Leupert v. Shields, 14 Colo.
App. 404, 60 Pac. 193 (1900); Siveyer v. Ollison, [1935] 2 K.B. 403.
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able, an action for breach of promise should lie for the reason, that
there has been a breach of warranty of capacity to marry amounting to fraud or deceit. 17 In Davis v. Pryor the court stated :18
"We fully realize the just and well-settled rule of law
which a man even though married, and for that reason incapacitated from executing a contract or promise of marriage to another, shall not escape liability for damages occasioned to a third party, if in point of fact, she entered
into the contract with the ignorance of the fact, that he had
a living wife."
The better view would seem to be that the promisor's incompetency to marry because of statute or court decree is no defense,
if the promisee had no knowledge of the fact;19 for the promisee
has suffered damage through the fraud of the promisor and
the latter should not be allowed to use his disability as a defense.
In the cases where the enforceability turns on the construction of a
statute like the one in the Holder case, most courts have interpreted them as mere restrictions upon marriage within the proscribed time and not a prohibition on the right to promise to
marry.

20

There is again a difference of judicial opinion as to the enforceability of the marriage contract even where the plaintiff knows that
the defendant is incapable of contracting marriage. The group of
cases which hold that the contract is unenforceable rely upon the
principle that such promises (i.e., those made when plaintiff knows
of defendant's inability) "tend to disrupt the stability of marriage. "21 The other group of cases allow an action on the promise
even though the plaintiff knew that defendant was either married
22
or incapacitated by statute or divorce decree.
2
In Buelna v. Ryan , 3 there was a legislative prohibition that "a
subsequent marriage is illegal and void when contracted by a diSpiers v. Hunt, [1908] 1 K.B. 720; commented on in 24 L. T. REV. 183.
18112 Fed. 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1901).
19 The cases are collected in 47 A.L.R. 400.
20Tierney v. Tierney, 86 Colo. 362, 281 Pac. 737 (1929); MeVickar
v. MeVickar, 123 Misc., 644, 205 N.Y.Supp. 834 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
5
2Breach of Promise-Validity of Promise Made Pending Decree Nisi by
Party to Divorce Proceedings, 24 VA.L. REv. 77 (1938).
22 Buelna v. Ryan, 139 Cal. 630, 73 Pac. 466 (1903); Morgan v. Muencli,
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vorced person within one year subsequent to the date of the divorce
decree." Nevertheless the court said:
"After the divorce was granted the plaintiff was no longer
a married woman and had the right to contract to marry
and to marry outside the state. Under the section of the
code, the plaintiff did not have the right to marry in this
state until one year after the decree of divorce was entered;
but she had the right to marry at a certain time; and she
had the right before the time to agree to marry, provided
the agreement was not to be consummated until the end of
that time."
The leading English case on the subject which follows the view
of the Buetna case, supra, is Fender v. Miday. 24 There the plaintiff, a young woman, met the defendant, who was to her knowledge
a married man. Sexual intercourse began to take place between
them in 1932. In 1933 the defendant's wife obtained a decree
nisi for the disolution of her marriage with him. The defendant
had promised to marry the plaintiff when the decree became absolute but after the decree did become final, the defendant refused
to marry the plaintiff. The case squarely presented the issue:
whether a promise, made by one spouse after a decree nis5 has
been pronounced, to marry a third party after the decree has been
made absolute, is void on the grounds of public policy. The court,
in a three to two decision, decided in the negative, stating that
courts are not lightly to interfere with freedom of contract, that
since the consortium is broken by the decree nisi and the normal
obligations and conditions of marriage have ceased at the issuance
of such decree, that judicial experience has shown that reconciliation does not take place, for the bottom has dropped out of the
26
marriage.
The majority of the court was of the opinion that if reconciliation were likely it would have taken place before the institution of
the suit; for petitions of divorce, the court said, are not "casual
steps but a measure which requires deliberation and intention."
The court rejected the argument that such promises tend toward
" [1938] A.C. 1.
2""[W]here a decree nisi has . . . been obtained, although the marriage
still e-xists legally, it is unlikely that a spouse will exercise the care and devotion hoped for between husband and wife." Cotracts-Breachof PromiseEnforceability of Promise to Marry Made after Decree Nisi but Before Absolute Decree, 84 U. oF PA. L. R v. 1025, 1026.
2 Fender v. Milday, [1938] A.C. 1, 21.
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immorality and suggested that such promises tend to establish
moral relations by virtue of an early marriage.
A consideration which seems to be of great importance in the
determination of whether a contract to marry should or should not
be enforced is the probability that parties will reach a reconciliation
if they are prevented by court or statutory decree from remarrying
or contracting to remarry within a certain time. Statistical data
as to the effectiveness of such a prohibition would be a valuable
guide in deciding whether or not strict adherence to such prohibitions is warranted. If such data indicated that reconciliation is unlikely once a divorce suit has commenced, reasons for strict application of such restrictions would be lacking. Under circumstances
which show that reconciliation is improbable the most desirable
procedure for the courts to follow is to act in "accord with the
present concept of the function of divorce to terminate a marriage
which has in fact failed.''27 This, of course, would alleviate the
problem of the enforceability of contracts to marry entered into
within a prohibited period. With the exception of the comment by
Lord Atkin in the Fender case, supra, to the effect that the number
of decrees nisi which are not made absolute is only a minute fraction of those granted, there seems to be a dearth of such data.2 8
The dissenters in the Fender case did not look beyond the
proposition that the promise was made while the promisor was still
technically married, since the parties are considered husband and
wife until the decree nisi is made absolute. It was their contention
that the contract tended to create an obstacle for reconciliation;
that it was incompatible with the status of marriage. Lord Roche
remarked that "the court cannot treat an expected or imminent
divorce the same as divorce.' '2 A statement by Lord Russell,
worth quoting for its literary quality, is :30
"The institution of marriage has long been on a slippery
slope. What was once a holy estate enduring for the joint
lives of the spouses is steadily assuming the characteristics
of a contract for a tenancy at will."
To this Lord Killowin added that he did not wish to obstruct
any person who desires to marry after divorce from taking that
2' See, Divorce: Effect of Reconciliation on Bight to Final Decree, 37
CALir. L. REv. 305 (1949).
28 Fender v. Milday, [1938] A.C. 1 at 18.
29 Id. at 54.
30 Id. at 34-35.
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step. He would "only compel a person already married to await
with decency until he or she is no longer 3a married person before
becoming the object of a fresh betrothal." 1
Reviews3 2 of the Fender case state that it is a departure from
the rule that a breach of promise action cannot be maintained if the
promisee knew of the promisor's marriage or of his statutory incompetency. The comments reveal that the apparent extension by
the Fender case of breach of promise actions is clearly contrary to
the modern American trend towards limiting all "heart balm"
38

actions.

Considering the cases reviewed and in spite of the legislative
anti-heart balm trends, the most desirable attitude on the part of
the court would seem to favor enforcing a promise to marry entered
into within a prohibited period but not to be consummated until
the expiration of that period, provided that there are strong
3 4
grounds warranting an action for breach of promise to marry.
The contract should not be held invalid for the sole reason that it
was entered into within the proscribed period. Two important
considerations to be taken into account in determining the enforceability of such contracts are: (1) the probability of reconciliation
of the divorced parties; and (2) the knowledge of the promisee of
the promisor's inability. If it appears that reconciliation is unattainable, the promisor should be held to his promise if the
promisee had no knowledge of the promisor's incapacity to marry
or where the promisor fraudulently concealed his incompetency
from the promisee to the damage of the latter.
It is difficult to require orthodox trial courts to handle these
situations adequately when they are burdened with the interpretation of statutes which have been diversely construed and which
frequently become inapplicable to novel situations. A drastic
measure, but one that seems practical, would be to modify present
marital legislation toward the end of establishing a group of judicial tribunals (perhaps special domestic relations courts) to dis1Id. at 35.
2 Marriage, Contracts,and Public Policy, 54 HIAav. L. REv. 473, 476 (1941);

Breach of Marriage Promise-Promiseof Marriage by a Party to a Divorce
Action After Entry of Decree Nisi Void as Against Public Policy, 49 HAv. L.
REV. 648 (1936); Weyl, Breach of Promise-Liabilityfor Promise Made Subsequent to Decree Nisi but Prior to Final Decree, 11 So. CALIF. L. REV. 357
(1938). Also, see notes 21 and 25 supra, and 178 L. T. BRV. 343 (1934).
See note 21 supra.
" VE&NnR, op. cit. supra note 1, VoL 1 § 6.
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pose of these problems with whatever marriage counselling and adjudication that seems proper in the particular case. It is submitted
that such considerations as these tribunals could offer, unhindered
by legislation which crystalizes frequently into rules of thumb, will
greatly facilitate the solution of problems involving marriage contracts and will better prevent the miscarriages of justice which literal interpretations of statutes can often produce.
As an alternative solution, it is submitted that the enactment of
two types of statutes would be helpful in coping with the problem
raised by promises to marry. The first type would leave within
the discretion of the trial court the power to determine the enforceability of such promises. The second type would impose
criminal or contempt penalty by which the state would punish a
person who made a promise to marry in violation of judicial decree
or statutory enactment.

